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In the criminal justice system, risk assessment instruments (RAIs) provide information about 
justice involved individuals that court officials use to make various decisions.  This dissertation 
explores the adoption and impact of state-level policies regarding the use of risk assessment 
instruments.  This is the first study to collect detailed data on state RAI policies across all 50 states.  
The first chapter explains the distinction between research on assessment instruments and research 
on assessment policy, and details the data collection process.  I find that many states adopted RAI 
policy while recovering from the Great Recession and also facing strong criticism for police brutality 
against people of color.  The second chapter examines the motivations for policy adoption using 
event history analysis.  Neither economic nor social factors had an effect on the likelihood of RAI 
policy adoption.  Furthermore, while party values suggest adoption of RAIs for different purposes, I 
find no evidence that party moderated the influence of economic or social indicators.  Results 
suggest that RAI policies were passed for political purposes rather than to address specific needs.   
The third and fourth chapters examine the impact of RAI policy.  The third chapter 
evaluates the effects of state-level policies on prison populations.  Using several difference in 
differences models I find evidence that RAI policies decrease imprisonment rates under the right 
circumstances.  Average treatment effects show null results; however, group-time and cohort 
treatment effects provide insight into when and where there was a strong response to RAI policy.  
Policy effects were stronger for early adopters; however, duration models do not support a dosage 
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effect, suggesting that place-time context is key.  The final chapter examines policy effects on racial 
disparities in sentence length for new prison admissions.  Using ordered logistic regression, I find 
that policies which mandate RAIs for some offenders at the time of sentencing reduce the 
probability of receiving long sentence lengths for both Black and White offenders convicted of 
violent crime, and eliminate racial differences in sentence length for violent crime.  While most 
recent criminal justice reform has been focused on non-violent and drug crimes, RAI policies at 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
This dissertation explores the adoption and impact of state-level policies regarding the use of 
risk assessment instruments (RAIs) in the criminal justice system.  RAIs identify people who pose 
high (and low) risk to public safety.   They use strict mathematical models that produce a statistical 
prediction of risk and a final risk score.  They aid in decision-making all along the path of criminal 
procedure, through incarceration, release and reentry.  Risk assessments have evolved, but have been 
commonplace in some form throughout the United States for quite some time.  What is new is the 
involvement of the far-reaching hand of the state.  I show that by 2018, forty states had passed 
legislation mandating administration of RAIs for some offenders.  State-wide RAI policies impose a 
formal structure to what was an informal norm, structured only at the local level and by local 
officials.  Ideally, the new policies would have undergone a stringent evaluation process before wide-
spread adoption.  We should have an understanding of policy impact compared to business as usual 
and feel confident that there are no iatrogenic effects.  This is an important principle even during a 
trial or evaluative phase of policy development (MacKay, 2018).  However, the impact of RAI policy 
is yet unknown.  My research builds on previous work to investigate whether RAI policy is better 
than the status quo. 
Scholars have not reached consensus on the value of risk assessments for justice and public 
safety.  Risk assessment literature largely provides evaluation of specific assessments and in specific 
jurisdictions1.  A second body of work discusses the accuracy and equity of the algorithms that
 






 produce risk scores from a mathematical or theoretical perspective2.  Both ask questions about the 
accuracy of predictions, or whether predictions have the same failure rate across races for example.  
A third line of investigation examines changes in judicial discretion and offender outcomes when 
RAIs are used3.  These studies suggest that the value of RAIs is dependent on how they are used.  
Support for risk assessments has wavered.  Yet because of legislation, they are permanent fixtures of 
state systems.  I offer three unique contributions to the literature on risk assessments and justice 
outcomes.  First, I investigate policy rather than instrument or practice.   Second, my analysis 
includes all 50 states to understand broader impacts.  Third, I take an interdisciplinary approach to 
the study of criminal justice. 
There is a distinction between the effect of risk assessment instruments and the effect of risk 
assessment policies on justice outcomes.  Literature on the two subjects typically differ in scope, 
sample, and level of analysis.  Instrument studies often sample among the population of individuals 
who receive a risk score via the instrument.  They are usually at the offender-level, and limited to 
one or a few jurisdictions using the same instrument.  The research question is usually concerned 
with outcomes as a result of characteristics of the assessment itself, or of assessment 
implementation.  In contrast, policy studies are typically concerned with outcomes at a jurisdictional 
level, and sample from the population of jurisdictions.  The data itself may be at the jurisdiction- or 
offender- level.  The scope of these studies may be wider due to the nature of the research question 
or the accessibility of data.  I measure outcomes at a jurisdictional-level and my counterfactual is the 
absence of RAI policy. 
 
2 See Andrews, Bonta, & Wormith, 2016; Barabas, Dinakar, & Doyle, 2019; Douglas, Pugh, Singh, Savulescu, & Fazel, 
2017; Helmus & Babchishin, 2017 
 




I use literature from criminology, political science, economics, and public health to evaluate 
RAI policy.  Public policies operate in wide-ranging circumstances and to various degrees of fidelity.  
Outcomes under public policy may be significantly different than outcomes under study conditions.  
Public policy scholars use a variety of interdisciplinary theories and tools to determine impact.  The 
fields of education and health have embraced this approach but criminal justice research remains 
somewhat siloed (Pickett, 2019).  My work shows that an interdisciplinary approach enhances our 
understanding of criminal justice and its relationship with other fields. 
The remainder of this chapter will explain RAIs in greater detail and describe the policy data 
collection process.  I use those data to investigate policy effects across the United States.  The 
second chapter investigates the motivations for the wide-spread adoption of the policies.  We cannot 
begin to understand this policy intervention unless we know where to look.  To date there exists no 
compilation of RAI policies across the United States.  I built an original dataset of state RAI policies 
from 1994 to 2018.  I find that many states adopted RAI policy while recovering from the Great 
Recession and also facing strong criticism for police brutality against people of color.  However, 
neither economic nor social factors had an effect on the likelihood of adoption for either Republican 
or Democratic led states.  These and other results suggest that RAI policies were passed for political 
purposes rather than to address specific needs.   
The third and fourth chapters examine RAI policy effects.  The third chapter evaluates the 
impact of state-level policies on prison populations, and asks whether RAI policies reduce 
imprisonment rates.  I find evidence that RAI policies decrease imprisonment rates under the right 
circumstances.  The final chapter examines the ability of RAI policies to address racial disparities in 
sentence length for new prison admissions.  I find that policies which mandate RAIs at the time of 





1.1  Risk assessment instruments 
Generally, risk assessments provide court officials with information to help determine 
whether the defendant/offender should be released or punished, and the severity of the punishment.  
These tools are used at different points in the system.  Table 1-1 summarizes the purpose of the 
assessments at each stage.  It is helpful to imagine one individual as they move through the system.  
After arrest, a pretrial RAI helps the court decide whether the individual should be held or released 
pending trial.  If the defendant is convicted, a sentencing RAI may guide the decision to divert the 
offender to alternative programming, community supervision, or to prison.  If they are sentenced to 
prison, a prison RAI is used to determine the type of facility and custody level.  If they are sentenced 
to community supervision or after they complete their prison term, a probation/post-release RAI 
guides planning the intensity of supervision, and some include an individualized case management 
plan.  If they are still serving a sentence in prison but eligible for parole, a parole RAI aids a parole 
board in deciding to release or deny parole.  One individual may encounter none, one, or all of these 
assessments.  Some states have adopted a system of RAIs, while others only mandate their use at 
certain points, leaving local jurisdictions to design the rest of the process. 
There are dozens of specific assessments, developed by both public and private 
organizations, though some are more popular than others.  Three of the most widely used RAIs are 
the COMPAS, the Ohio Risk Assessment, and the Public Safety Assessment.  They differ in the risk 
factors used to model risk and have evolved over several decades.  The first generation of 
assessments were not actuarial and relied simply on professional judgement.  In the 1970s, 
mathematical measures that included specific risk factors were developed.  These second-generation 
assessments were the first actuarial instruments, some of which are still used.  Their risk factors are 
static, for example age, gender, and criminal history.  Third generation RAI risk factors are more 




generation RAIs use similar factors but also include case planning and risk management.  Third and 
fourth generation assessments are often automated and can be complex. 
1.2  RAI policy and data collection 
I define a RAI policy as any law regarding the use of RAIs as a matter of standard criminal 
procedure.  I examine state-level policies, excluding assessments that target specific populations.  I 
created a panel dataset of RAI policies by state from 1990 to 2018.  I searched LexisNexis 
Advance® for session laws4 referencing risk assessments in the criminal justice system.  I cross-
referenced and supplemented that collection with reports from research organizations and state 
websites.  To be included in this dataset the law must specifically mention the assessment of risk.  
For example, laws that require medical assessment, or assessment of rehabilitation needs are 
excluded.  I also exclude laws requiring RAIs specific to one type of crime.  For example, risk 
assessments designed for juveniles, for sexual violence, or for domestic violence are common but 
are not included.  These risk assessments predict specific actions and are fundamentally different 




4 Session laws are published at the end of each session as a collection of statutes enacted by the legislature.  The 
advantage of using session laws for an adoption study is that they reflect the laws as they were adopted without 




1.3  Tables 
 
 
Table 1-1. Summary of risk assessment instruments 
When assessment is used Purpose of assessment 
Pretrial detention Helps the court decide which defendants can be released pending trial 
Sentencing 
Sentencing judges use risk assessment to decide whether prison or alternative 
programs are necessary and the length/severity of the sentence 
Prison Used to determine the type of facility and custody level 
Probation/Post-release 
supervision 
Probation officers use the risk assessment to decide on the intensity of 
supervision, and to develop an individualized case management plan 
Parole boards and releasing  
authorities 






CHAPTER 2: RECESSION, STRUCTURAL INEQUALITY, AND PARTY: THE 
DETERMINANTS OF RISK ASSESSMENT POLICY ADOPTION IN STATE 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS 
 
2.1  Introduction 
Risk assessment instruments (RAIs) have been a common practice of the criminal justice 
system for over a century.  RAIs identify high and low risk offenders to aid decision-making.  
However, in the last few decades they have been enshrined in state law.  Virginia was the first to 
mandate RAIs in 1994 (Code of Virginia, 17.1-803).  They were included within a package of 
criminal justice reform aimed at reducing the state’s prison population by 25%.  Few states followed 
suit, instead passing three-strikes laws and other draconian policies that filled prisons.  But in the 
2010’s, for unknown reasons, RAIs attracted attention from policymakers and more states adopted 
RAI laws.  This movement towards a centralized system is an important shift.  Though a great deal 
of flexibility remains, state adoption brings with it some level of standardization to RAI 
implementation as jurisdictions are forced to conform to state law.  Now there is a movement to 
investigate their effectiveness and ensure they do not replicate or exacerbate structural inequalities 
that already permeate the justice system.  An important benefit of state-level analysis is the ability to 
estimate population-level policy effects.  However, our understanding of policy impact is limited by 
our understanding of how many and which states have adopted the policy.  This study is the first to 
provide a state-level map of RAI policies and examine motivations for adoption.   
The unique environment of the early 2000s through 2018 may have led economic and social 
problems to a shared solution.  According to Jones and Baumgartner’s extensive study on policy 




called agenda crowding or policy spillovers (Jones & Baumgartner, 2005).  This is when attention to 
one policy area is positively correlated with legislative action in another policy area.  Crime policy 
and high salience of economic conditions are positively correlated (Jones & Baumgartner, 2005, 
p.256).  Although their study examines national data and federal policy, it is reasonable to expect 
that during a time of economic crisis, like the Great Recession, governments might respond by 
addressing criminal justice.  On the other hand, crime policy and civil rights attention are negatively 
correlated, suggesting that when racial tensions are high governments are less likely to pass crime 
policies.  However, civil rights issues were directly tied to law enforcement’s abusive treatment of 
Black and Brown communities.  These factors point towards criminal justice reform as a natural 
target for civil rights activists of the time.  I examine whether states struggling with economic and 
social challenges were more likely to adopt RAI policy.  I also examine whether party moderated 
economic and social influence on the probability of adoption.   
2.1.1  Economic decline and recovery 
The subprime mortgage crisis in 2006 signaled the start of economic decline in the US.  
Homes lost value, and banks began to falter.  Lehman Brothers declared bankruptcy, and the stock 
market crashed.  The Great Recession lasted from December of 2007 to June of 2009.  By that time 
the net worth of households dropped from $69 trillion to $55 trillion, and unemployment rose to 
10% (Rich, 2013).  It was ended by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) 
which pumped $787 billion into the economy.  Ten years later, national economic indicators of 
recovery were mixed.   The unemployment rate recovered well, dropping down to just 4% in 
December of 2017.  Long term unemployment, however, remained high.  In 2007, about 17.6% of 
people unemployed were looking for work for 27 weeks or more.  In 2017, the proportion increased 
to almost 25% (Cunningham, 2018).  Furthermore, involuntary part-time employment was higher than 




full-time positions for which they had hoped.  Median incomes were the same or worse than they 
were in 2000 for people with lower levels of education and for racial minorities (Cunningham, 2018). 
At the state level, fiscal recovery varied widely.  Federal aid from ARRA played a key role in 
reducing unemployment and curbing further economic decline.  The share of state revenue that 
came from the federal government jumped about 10 percentage points from 2008 to 2010 in 
Tennessee, Alaska, and New Mexico, while the share in states like Wyoming, Louisiana, and North 
Dakota barely changed (Pew, 2019).  As aid from the Recovery Act ended, states had to replace 
those funds with alternate sources of revenue such as taxes.  But in 2014, 29 states still collected less 
tax revenue than they did at their peak quarter before the end of the recession (Pew, 2019).   
Meanwhile, 1 in 100 people experienced the Great Recession behind bars.  In 2008, 3.1% of 
the population, or 1 in 32 adults, were under some form of correctional supervision (Maruschak & 
Minton, 2020). Incarceration rates were the highest they had ever been at an average of 442 per 
100,000, and as high as 862 in the state of Louisiana.  Mass incarceration was (and remains) costly to 
state budgets.  Spending on corrections rose 127% between 1998 and 2008 (Warren, 2008).  As in 
Virginia, risk assessments were used in efforts to reduce the prison population.  With risk 
assessments, states may reserve prison for individuals who have a high risk of reoffending.  
Alternative programming and community supervision are less costly than prison, thus more 
offenders serving alternative sentences and fewer offenders in prison may save states money.  If 
RAIs were considered cost saving measures, policy adoption should be negatively associated with tax 
revenue, and positively associated with federal revenue and spending on corrections. 
2.1.2  Racial inequality and social unrest 
It is well documented that racial minorities are disproportionately affected in all aspects of 
the criminal justice system, Black males in particular.  Black individuals are punished more often and 




2012), drugs (Lyons, Lurigio, Roque, & Rodriguez, 2013), sentencing decisions (Bushway & Piehl, 
2009; Spohn & Cederblom, 1991), and capital punishment (Baumgartner, Davidson, Johnson, 
Krishnamurthy, & Wilson, 2018; Sarat, 2006).  High rates of incarceration in neighborhoods 
contribute to weakened familial and community relationships, and increase unemployment and 
criminal involvement (Crutchfield & Weeks, 2015).  Communities of color have borne the brunt of 
this systemic disassembly of social and economic infrastructure.  In 2008, 1 in 9 Black men between 
the ages of 20 and 34 were locked away in jail or prison, compared to 1 in 30 White men in the same 
age group (Warren, 2008).   
Just as many states started fiscal recovery from the Great Recession, public outrage and 
protest erupted in response to a series of high-profile deaths of Black individuals due to lethal 
interactions with law enforcement.  Figure 2-1 displays a sample of murders that garnered attention.  
It is by no means a comprehensive account of deadly encounters with police but illustrates the quick 
succession of events which heightened awareness of injustices that many had been trying to point 
out for decades.  Non-lethal discrimination also drew attention, especially for powerful figures.  For 
example, in July of 2009, Dr. Henry Luis Gates, a distinguished Harvard University professor at the 
time, was arrested trying to enter his own home in Cambridge, MA.  Even President Obama was 
subjected to persistent allegations that he was not a U.S citizen by a movement trying to delegitimize 
his presidency. 
Calls for action were not solely in response to isolated traumatic incidents.  They urged 
acknowledgement and restitution for centuries of racial violence embedded in American law.  The 
Black Lives Matter movement, or BLM, was established in 2013, right after the man who shot and 
killed 17-year-old Trayvon Martin was acquitted of murder charges.  According to their website, the 
purpose of BLM is to fight against White supremacy, and systematic oppression and violence against 




incarceration.  The 20/20 Bipartisan Justice Center, a group of Black Republicans, Democrats, and 
Independents, was established in 2015 specifically to influence policy.  Through listening forums and 
partnerships with Google, Facebook, and BET they called on political candidates to identify their 
platform for criminal justice reforms.  Protests in public arenas and on social media put pressure on 
policymakers to act.  RAIs curb judicial discretion by standardizing assignment of risk levels.  Social 
justice advocates hoped that this would help relieve racial bias in court official decision-making.  If 
RAIs were considered a tool to address bias and systemic disparate outcomes, then RAI policy 
adoption should be positively correlated with measures of racial inequality. 
2.1.3  RAI policy adoption and politics 
Scholars of political science who study the way policies spread have shown that states look 
to neighboring states, states in their geographical region, and states with similar ideologies for 
guidance on good governance, and to identify polices that are politically advantageous (Berry & 
Berry, 1990; Graham, Shipan, & Volden, 2013; Grossback, Nicholson-Crotty, & Peterson, 2004; 
Mooney, 1999; Volden, 2006).  While RAIs enjoyed bipartisan support, the rhetoric regarding their 
benefits differed by party.  All political parties prioritize the economy.  Republicans, however, 
promote fiscal restraint.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that Democrats are not only concerned about 
the economy but also interested in addressing social problems.  Democratic senators often reference 
equity in defense of criminal justice bills.  For example, Dick Durbin (D-IL) praised the First Step 
Act5 as “a victory for those who want to make sure that we have a just system when it comes to 
criminal law” (Durbin, 2018).  Senator Corey Booker (D-NJ) has said that mass incarceration “cost 
taxpayers billions of dollars, drained our economy, compromised public safety, hurt our children, 
and disproportionately harmed communities of color while devaluing the very idea of justice in 
 
5 The First Step Act increased the cap on “good time” credits and made crack cocaine sentencing reforms from a 2010 





America” (Booker, 2018).  Since both parties are affected by the economy, I expect that the effect of 
economic indicators on the probability of RAI policy adoption will not differ by party.  However, 
indicators of racial inequality should have a stronger effect when state governments are Democratic. 
2.2  Methods 
Once a local decision, the ability to analyze policy effects on a large scale was difficult since 
there are thousands of jurisdictions, each with their own requirements.  However, information about 
state-level policies is much more manageable in terms of data collection.  I developed an original 
dataset of state-level RAI policies from 1990 to 2018.  A summary table of the dataset is available in 
Appendix A.  I show that forty states adopted RAI policy by 2018.  Figure 2-2 shows the cumulative 
percent of the United States with state-level RAI policies.  From 2010 to 2018, the percentage of 
Americans living under state-wide RAI policies rose from 6% to over 78%6.  For this study, I use 
data from 2006 to 2018 to focus on the period surrounding the Great Recession through the latest 
available data.  This timeframe coincides with the trend towards state RAI policy adoption. 
To assess the economic condition of each state-year I use indicators of fiscal health 
frequently used by economists and especially useful to evaluate recovery from the recession.  Table 
2-1 provides a list of variables and sources.  The percent of state revenue from the federal 
government was unusually high because of funds from the Recovery Act, and higher in states that 
suffered more.  As those funds expired and states regained their own footing, they were able to 
increase revenue from taxes.  I use the difference between state-year tax revenue and tax revenue 
during the state’s peak quarter before the end of the recession as an indicator of recovery.  I also use 
the percent of total expenditures spent on corrections as a direct measure of economic pressure due 
to high incarceration rates. 
 





To assess the state of racial inequality I use several measures of structural racism from public 
health literature (Groos, Wallace, Hardeman, & Theall, 2018; Lukachko, Hatzenbuehler, & Keyes, 
2014; Mesic et al., 2018).  I have already discussed racial disparities in incarceration rates.  The Black 
to White incarceration rate ratio is the first measure of racial inequality.  During the study period, the 
Great Recession had a disproportional financial impact on Black families.  Between 2005 and 2009, 
the median net worth of Black households dropped by 53 percent, while White household net worth 
dropped by 17 percent (Tippett, Jones-DeWeever, Rockeymoore, Hamilton, & Darity Jr, 2014).  I 
use the Black to White median income ratio as a second measure of racial inequality.  Finally, I use a 
measure of racial residential segregation.  Residential segregation is increasingly identified as a cause 
of health, educational, and employment disparities between races (Williams & Collins, 2014).  I use 
the Dissimilarity Index (DI) which indicates the proportion of Blacks that would have to change 
their place of residence to achieve an even distribution of Whites and Blacks in the region.  The DI 
is calculated as follows: 
𝐷𝐼 =  .5 ∗ ∑ |
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑥𝑖/𝑋 −  𝑦𝑖/𝑌  
where n is the number of counties in the state, 𝑥𝑖 is the count of Black residents in the county, X is 
the count of Black residents in the state, 𝑦𝑖 is the count of White residents in the county, and Y is 
the count of White residents in the state7. 
To measure the direct impact of violence and crime I include the incarceration rate, violent 
crime rate, and property crime rate.  I expect the probability of RAI policy adoption to increase as 
incarceration and crime rates rise.  State-level controls include the proportion of Black residents in 
 
7 I use county level population estimates from the National Cancer Institute: Surveillance, Epidemiology, and End 
Results Program which stores county-level Black and White population data compiled by race and age from 1969-2018.  
County level data are preferred to census tract data in this case because the DI is highly influenced by small populations.  





the state, the unemployment rate, and per capita income (logged).  I also estimate the effect of 
external factors using the proportion of neighboring states that previously adopted a RAI policy, and 
the census division8.  Table 2-2 shows means for all covariates with standard deviations in 
parentheses.  There are 650 state-year observations in the full dataset.  Column 1 is the full sample 
of state-years.  Columns 2 and 3 display means for state-year without and with RAI policies, 
respectively.  Columns 4 and 5 display means for states with Republican and Democratic governors, 
respectively.  Column 6 displays the p-value from a comparison of means between Republican and 
Democratic state-years.  State-year observations without RAI policy had more Democratic 
legislatures, and a larger difference between state-year tax revenue and peak tax revenue on average.  
Observations without RAIs had a higher Black to White incarceration rate ratio on average.  They 
also had higher violent and property crime rates.  On average they were Whiter, less employed, and 
less wealthy than observations with RAI policy.  The difference in means between state-years with 
Republican and Democratic governors were statistically significant for nearly all variables.  
I used event history analysis (EHA) of first-time adoption of RAI policies to investigate 
adoption motivations.  In the main analysis, the dependent variable is a dichotomous indicator of 
any RAI policy adoption in that state in that year.  Following standard EHA practice, state-years 
after the year of adoption were removed.  The final dataset for analysis included 412 state-year 
observations from 2006 to 2018.  I included year fixed effects to account for other factors that may 
have made RAI policies more attractive in a particular year, for example in 2011 when there is a 
spike in adoption.  To estimate party moderation all economic, social, and public safety variables 
 
8 Year fixed effects precluded me from using a measure of total previous adopters as is common in diffusion literature.  





were interacted with party as measured by the percent of Democrats in the state legislature9.  Robust 
standard errors are clustered by state-year to account for non-independence of errors. 
2.3  Results  
Results of EHA analyses are displayed in Table 2-3.  Model 1 does not include interactions 
for party moderation.  Per capita income (logged) is the only internal measure that was significant 
and had a negative effect on the likelihood of RAI policy adoption.  This suggests that wealthier 
states had less incentive to impose this intervention on their criminal justice system.  The proportion 
of neighboring states also had a negative effect on the likelihood of adoption.  This is somewhat 
unexpected as diffusion studies often find that states follow their neighbors.  When the interactions 
were added, in model 2, the negative neighbor effect grew stronger.  This suggests that neighbor 
adoption was a deterrent.  Certain regional divisions were more likely than others to adopt RAI 
policies, namely the West South Central and Pacific regions10. 
Economic measures had no effect on the likelihood of adopting RAI policy.  The hypothesis 
that state fiscal needs were an incentive for adoption is not supported.  Among the racial inequality 
measures, DI had a positive effect on the probability of adoption and was the only statistically 
significant finding.  Joint tests of significance fail to reject the null hypothesis.  This offers only weak 
support for the hypothesis that large systemic racial disparities were an incentive for adoption.  In 
addition, no economic or inequality interactions with party had an effect.  The hypothesis that party 
moderated the effect based on party values is not supported. 
Neither violent nor property crime rates influenced the probability of adoption.  This is 
unsurprising given that crime rates are also uncorrelated with incarceration rates.  In contrast, 
 
9 I also tested the model using 1) an indicator of Democratic governor as the party measure, and 2) using an indicator of 
party in power, both with similar results. 
 
10 The West South Central division includes Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas.  The Pacific division include 




incarceration rate had the strongest internal effect.  An increase in the incarceration rate was 
associated with a reduction in the probability of adoption.  Moreover, the effect is moderated by 
party.  Figure 2-3 shows the average marginal effect of incarceration rate as the proportion of 
Democrats in the legislature changes.  The effect remains negative until the legislature reaches about 
70% Democrats.  However, during this period the maximum proportion of Democrats was 61%.   
Figure 2-4 shows the predicted probability of adoption in three scenarios: 1) at the mean 
proportion of Democrats, 50%, 2) at one standard deviation below the mean, 33%, and 3) at one 
standard deviation above the mean, 68%.  When incarceration rates are low legislatures that are 2/3 
Republican have a 50% probability of adoption, while legislatures that are 2/3 Democratic have only 
9% probability of adoption.  The steep downward slope of the dotted line shows the marginal 
effects of incarceration rates are much larger in majority Republican states.  In contrast, the slope of 
majority Democratic legislatures, the solid line, is almost flat. At high incarceration rates the 
probabilities for all three groups almost converge between 7 and 8%. 
2.4  Discussion and implications 
Although the main hypotheses are not supported, the null results are telling.  There is no 
evidence that RAI policies were mandated as a mechanism for cost saving.  Likewise, there is no 
evidence that the policies were adopted to address racial inequality.   Party did not moderate 
economic or social effects.  Political rhetoric around criminal justice reforms often played to party 
values – fiscal responsibility for Republicans, and social justice for Democrats – however, RAI 
policy adoption did not fall along those lines.  It is possible that legislators opted to back fewer 
policies with larger changes to address economic and social need, rather than using political capital 
to pass policies with indirect and incremental change, such as RAIs. Given the severity and 
persistence of both the Great Recession and structural racism, states may have been focused on 




Incarceration rates, which would be directly affected by RAI policies, were the strongest 
determinants of adoption.   Interestingly, Republicans were influenced by incarceration more than 
Democrats.  Furthermore, Republicans were most likely to adopt when incarceration rates were low, 
not high.  Democrats on the other hand were unmoved by changes in incarceration rates.  Studies 
show that conservative governments are more likely to be influenced by the political consequences 
of policy adoption, while liberal governments are more influenced by policy effects (Gilardi, 2010).  
Since there are few studies about the broader impacts of RAI mandates it is difficult to make any 
statement of impact with certainty, leaving arguments wide open to opportunistic conjecture. 
Perhaps adoption was less about the impact of RAIs, and more about claiming credit for “taking 
action.”  Given the high rate of adoption across the country, over 80% of states, RAI policies may 
represent the low hanging fruit of criminal justice reform, a signal of acquiescence to placate 
demands for change. 
The economic, social, and political indicators here do not capture motivations for RAI 
policy adoption.  In some ways the bipartisanship of RAI policy represents a return to reform efforts 
a decade earlier.  In the late 2000’s a few pieces of legislation – the Second Chance Act and the Fair 
Sentencing Act – made their way to the President’s desk in a rare show of bipartisanship.  These two 
federal laws provided funds for reentry programs and shortened sentences for crack cocaine to 
reduce prison populations and recidivism.  They signaled a change from decades of policies 
imposing harsh and swift punishment in eras characterized by a focus on incapacitation, individual 
responsibility, and just deserts.  But attention abruptly turned to the economy as the United States 
entered the Great Recession.  State budgets were devastated by the economic decline, and they were 
forced to borrow funds from the federal government and make difficult decisions to cut spending 
where they could.  Just as economies began to improve, growing social unrest led to mass protests 




Communities were tense and governments frustrated by a social crisis that detracted attention from 
economic recovery.  The Smart on Crime initiative led by Attorney General Eric Holder dedicated 
funds for evidenced-based practices that might save money, address racial bias, and restore trust in 
the system.  Amidst these competing forces, risk assessments gained popularity as tools that could 
do just that. 
However, state risk assessment policies lack the proactive measures of those early federal 
laws.  Instead, they are procedural changes that reflect no obvious reformist stance and are highly 
dependent on implementation.  Even so, they could still make a significant impact on the 
composition of incarcerated and community populations.  If they accurately identify high risk 
individuals with equitable outcomes many offenders may avoid prison altogether, staying instead in 
their communities under supervision or in treatment programs.  This in turn may affect public 
health and economic outcomes for both the individual and their families.  Communities of color 
continue to experience high incarceration rates.  Racial tensions have only intensified after a 
presidential administration that refused to acknowledge systemic racism and bolstered White 
supremacist conspiracy theories.  With mandates in place, states will need to focus on enforcement 
and oversight.  Then we may begin to understand whether risk assessment policies help address 





2.5  Tables 
 
  
Table 2-1. EHA model variables and sources 
Construct Measure Source 
Economy % of federal revenue Fiscal 50, Pew Charitable Trusts 
% tax revenue Fiscal 50, Pew Charitable Trusts 
% expenditures on corrections Annual Survey of State Government Finances 
 
Racial inequity Dissimilarity Index Author construction 
Black/White incarceration rate ratio Author construction from National Prisoner 
Statistics and US Census 
Black/White median income ratio Author construction from American 
Community Survey 
 
Public Safety Incarceration rate National Prisoner Statistics, Bureau of Justice 
Statistics 
Violent crime rate Universal Crime Reports, FBI 
Property crime rate Universal Crime Reports, FBI 
 
State controls % Black residents American Community Survey 1-year 
estimates 
Unemployment rate American Community Survey 1-year 
estimates 
Per capita income (logged) American Community Survey 1-year 
estimates 
 
Diffusion % of neighbors with policy Author construction 
Geographical division US Census 
 






Table 2-2. Descriptive statistics of adoption model covariates 
Variable (1) 
Full sample  
(2) 
Full sample 
RAI = 0 
(3) 
Full sample 


























































































































































































N 650 423 277 392 301 
 
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses.  Column 1 is the full sample of state-years.  Columns 2 and 3 display 
means for state-year without and with RAI policies. Columns 4 and 5 display means for states with Republican 
and Democratic governors, respectively.  Column 6 displays the p-value from a comparison of means between 











Economic factors     
Percent federal revenue -0.12 (0.07) 0.25 (0.24) 
Percent tax revenue -0.02 (0.02) -0.02 (0.05) 
Percent expenditures on corrections 0.88 (0.80) 0.18 (2.11) 
 
    
Racial equity factors     
DI 0.03 (0.04) 0.32 (0.15)* 
B/W incarceration rate ratio 0.11 (0.12) 0.34 (0.55) 
B/W median income ratio 3.57 (1.98) -5.10 (7.92) 
 
    
Public safety factors     
Incarceration rate 0.00 (0.003) -0.03 (0.01)* 
Violent crime rate 0.00 (0.003) 0.02 (0.02) 
Property crime rate 0.00 (0.001) -0.001 (0.002) 
 
    
Party     
Proportion Democratic legislature -0.03 (0.03) 0.18 (0.23) 
 
    
Party Interactions     
Federal rev*party   -0.01 (0.01) 
Tax rev*party   -0.0004 (0.001) 
Expenditures*party   0.02 (0.04) 
DI*party   -0.01 (0.003) 
B/W incarceration*party   -0.01 (0.01) 
B/W median income*party   0.15 (0.14) 
Incarceration rate*party   0.001 (0.0002)* 
Violent crime*party   -0.0003 (0.0004) 
Property crime*party   -0.00003 (0.00005) 
 
    
Diffusion     
Percent neighbors with RAI policy -4.38 (1.30)*** -6.80 (1.61)*** 
Division (comparison = New England)     
Mid- Atlantic 0.23 (1.82) 0.87 (1.84) 
East North Central -0.05 (1.90) -0.25 (2.03) 
North West Central -0.74 (1.51) -0.47 (1.67) 
South Atlantic -0.80 (2.37) 2.57 (2.16) 
East South Central 0.16 (2.32) 3.25 (2.14) 
West South Central 1.83 (1.94) 8.07 (2.84)** 
Mountain -2.52 (1.73) 0.09 (2.24) 
Pacific 1.32 (1.38) 3.36 (1.71)* 
 
    
State-level controls     
Proportion Black state residents 0.12 (0.08) 0.12 (0.06) 
Unemployment rate -0.20 (0.24) 0.01 (0.23) 
Per capita income (logged) -8.06 (3.38)* -8.90 (4.02)* 
 
    
Constant 83.72 (36.71)* 84.13 (42.92)* 
N 403 403 
Wald  72.07*** 108.37*** 
Notes: Coefficients are log odds.  Year fixed effects with robust standard errors in 
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CHAPTER 3: THE EFFECT OF STATE-LEVEL RISK ASSESSMENT POLICY ON 
PRISON POPULATIONS 
 
3.1  Introduction 
In the criminal justice system, risk assessment instruments (RAIs) provide information that 
is used to make decisions about individuals at various points in the process.  RAIs are expected to 
improve efficiency and fairness by quickly and easily identifying people who are most like other 
individuals who are noncompliant (e.g. fail to appear in court, or commit a crime) so that their 
behavior can be managed with the appropriate precaution or punishment.  RAI policies are neither 
inherently punitive nor lenient, but as a process tool, RAIs have the potential to affect criminal 
justice outcomes.  Four out of five states have passed laws mandating the use of RAIs in their 
criminal justice system.  The first was passed in 1994 and the latest data available is from 2018.  
During that time the United States experienced an exponential rise in incarceration rates.  An oft-
cited reason for RAI policy adoption is to reduce the prison population.  Yet it is unclear whether 
RAIs have been successful towards that end.  This study asks 1) what were the effects of state-wide 
RAI mandates on prison populations, and 2) were there differences between early and late policy 
adopters?   
In theory RAIs could lead to a reduction in prison populations in several ways.  Generally, 
RAIs serve to move individuals away from a prison sentence.  At pre-trial, assessments aid in the 
decision to hold or release individuals who have been arrested and detained.  Studies show that 
those who are detained are more likely to be convicted and sent to prison (Dobbie, Goldin, & Yang, 




recommended for release.  Likewise, RAIs at sentencing help identify low risk offenders who might 
do well in community supervision or treatment programs rather than prison.  RAIs at parole serve a 
similar purpose but after an offender has already served part of their sentence in prison.  If RAIs are 
indeed working as theory suggests, RAI policy should reduce overall imprisonment rates.  It may 
take some time for effects to be detectable, therefor it is important to observe trends over time. 
So far, RAIs appear to have mixed effects at a local level.  The use of RAIs has led to 
declines in bail violation rates (Cooprider, 2009), and decreases in re-arrests for both violent and 
nonviolent crimes (Berk, 2017).  However, other studies find they had no effect on the probability 
of incarceration or recidivism for nonviolent offenders (M. T. Stevenson & Doleac, 2019).  These 
studies focus on the practice of using RAIs, with samples in a few jurisdictions.  We have less 
understanding of how RAIs impact the system on a larger scale.  A study of Kentucky’s 2011 law 
mandating pre-trial RAIs found that the law changed bail setting practice, but had only small effects 
on pretrial release rates (M. Stevenson, 2018).  Stevenson’s research is one of the only studies to 
examine the effects of broader policy change regarding RAI adoption.   
3.2  Methods 
I use several difference in differences models to estimate the impact of RAI policy adoption 
on imprisonment rates and new prison admissions.  I use an original state-level panel dataset of RAI 
policy adoption from 1990 to 2018 for the identification process.  This period includes a few years 
before the first state-adopter through the most recent year with available data.  Outcome measures 
were obtained from the National Prisoner Statistics via the Bureau of Justice Statistics Corrections 
Statistical Analysis Tool.  Imprisonment rates are available for all 50 states and all 29 years yielding 
1450 state-year observations.  New prison admissions are available for the same periods, however, 




All analyses include the same covariates.  They are measures associated with incarceration 
rates and RAI policy adoption, including the percent of the state population who are Black, the 
poverty rate, the percent of Democratic state legislators, and per capita income (logged) (see Chapter 
2; Beckett & Western, 2001; Yates & Fording, 2005).  Although research has shown there is little 
connection between violent and property crime rates and incarceration rates, crime rates are 
included in the model for good measure. Table 3-1 shows variable means with standard deviations in 
parentheses.  Column 1 refers to the full panel of state-years.  Columns 2 and 3 refer to state-years in 
states that did not adopt RAI policy during the study period and states that did, respectively.  
Columns 4 and 5 refer to state-year observations without and with RAI policy, respectively.  States 
that passed RAI policies have higher means for both incarceration rate and new prison admissions 
than states that did not.  However, Figure 3-1 shows the differences are consistent throughout the 
study period for both outcomes.  On average there are only small differences in crime rates between 
states that did and did not have RAI policy by 2018 (columns 2 and 3); however, violent and 
property crime rates in untreated observations were much higher than in treated observations 
(columns 4 and 5).  The remaining controls were similar across all columns. 
The challenge in exploring policy effects is that all potential outcomes cannot be observed 
for the same unit after treatment, therefor we estimate the average causal effect.  To estimate the 
effect of RAI policy adoption on outcomes I use difference in differences models.  A simple 
difference in differences design subtracts trends in the pre-treatment period from trends in the post-
treatment period for treatment and control groups to isolate the average treatment effect on the 
treated group (ATT).  However, an additional hurdle arises when the policy is adopted at different 
times for different states.  In that case, the pre- and post- treatment periods are muddled; some 




this type of study is the two-way fixed effect (TWFE) model.  I begin by using the following 
regression: 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛼𝑔 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
where 𝑌 is the outcome for group 𝑖 in time 𝑡, 𝛼𝑡 is the year fixed effect, 𝛼𝑔 is the state fixed effect, 
𝛽1 is the treatment effect for group 𝑖 in time 𝑡, 𝛽2 is a vector of state-level controls, and 𝜀 is the 
error.  The year fixed effect accounts for time specific but group invariant unobserved confounders.  
The state fixed effect accounts for group specific but time invariant unobserved confounders.  
However, Goodman-Bacon (2018) shows that TWFE estimates are sensitive to the size of 
each group, the timing of treatment, and the total number of time periods.  The estimates in the 
TWFE model may be negatively weighed, returning a biased average if the treatment effect is 
heterogenous over time (Athey & Imbens, 2018; Borusyak & Jaravel, 2016; de Chaisemartin & 
D’Haultfœuille, 2020; Dettmann, Giebler, & Weyh, 2020; Goodman-Bacon, 2018).  The difference 
in differences method developed by Calloway and Sant’Anna (2020) avoids the negative weights 
problem.  Theirs is a staggered adoption model.  In a staggered adoption, once the group is exposed 
to treatment, the treatment remains, i.e. the treatment cannot turn on and off.  Education is the 
traditional example as knowledge does not disappear after the treatment has occurred, unlike some 
medications whose effects may wain immediately or shortly after they are stopped.  My analysis 
includes forty state RAI policies adopted over more than twenty years.  Heterogenous treatment 
effects are plausible because of the varying start dates and treatment durations (censored by the 
study period).  For all non-TWFE estimations I use the Difference in Differences (“DID”) and the 
Doubly Robust Difference in Differences (“DRDID”) packages in R11. 
 




 Callaway and Sant’Anna (2020) create cohorts by defining groups based on the time of first 
treatment and estimate group-time specific average treatment effects (𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑔,𝑡).  Table 3-2 shows the 
cohorts in this study and the states included in each.  Like the canonical difference in differences 
model, the main assumption is that there are parallel trends for treatment and control groups in the 
pre-treatment period.  However, the group-time approach allows for conditioning on pre-treatment 
covariates where other approaches focus on unconditional difference in differences.  I use outcome 
regression to model the conditional expectation of outcome trends for the comparison group using 
the same covariates as the TWFE model.   
Another unique feature of the group-time approach is that it permits treatment group 
comparison to either never-treated or not-yet-treated groups.  The decision is theoretical and based 
on the context of the specific study.  Here, I use not-yet-treated groups for several reasons:  1) The 
not-yet-treated control yields a larger comparison group that includes both states which are never 
treated and states that are treated at a later time, which 2) makes that comparison group comparable 
to the control group in the other static and dynamic models, and 3) there is no reason to believe 
states that did not adopt RAI policy during the study period are fundamentally different than states 
that did12.  I aggregate group-time averages by group to estimate cohort effects.  To estimate the 
overall treatment effect, I average the effect for each cohort across all time periods.  This estimation 
procedure yields results that are comparable to the ATT of the TWFE model.   
In addition to cohort and overall treatment effects, I explore whether RAI policies had 
different effects depending on how long they were in place.  Duration models, or event studies, 
center the data at the time of the event (adoption) and estimate effects of different exposure length, 
 




or dosage.  My analysis includes the 9 years before and after the adoption of RAI policy.  I aggregate 
the group-time averages by the number of years they experienced the treatment.   
3.3  Results 
For imprisonment rates and new prison admissions, the group-time model analyzes 16 
cohorts over 28 years, yielding 448 group-time specific policy effects.  Figure 3-2 shows group-time 
average effects of RAI policy adoption on imprisonment rates and 95% confidence intervals in each 
year for select groups.  Cohorts 2009, 2011, 2014, 2015, and 2017 are the largest groups.  Cohorts 
1999, 2007, and 2008 have some of the strongest group-time effects.  Pre-treatment trends are 
conditioned on state-level controls.  Controls include states that were never treated during the study 
period or treated at a later time13.  Robust standard errors are clustered by state.  The vertical dashed 
line is the year of policy adoption for that cohort.  Points before the line are pre-treatment effects, 
and points after the line are post-treatment effe cts.  A visual inspection of the eight cohorts in 
Figure 3-2 reveals that most group-time effects preceding the dashed vertical line were around 0.  In 
the full sample of observations, 90% of pre-treatment group-time average effects were null, 
providing evidence that the parallel trends assumption holds.   
Post-treatment group-time effects are mixed.  The graphs in Figure 3-2 show heterogeneity 
in the way cohorts responded to RAI policy.  Cohorts 2007 and 2008 show immediate and 
statistically significant changes in the imprisonment rate.  However, they are in opposite directions; 
the 2007 cohort showed a decrease in imprisonment rates, while the 2008 cohort showed an increase 
in imprisonment rates in response to policy adoption.  23% of the full sample post-treatment group-
time effects were statistically significant.  Of the statistically significant effects, 75% were negative.  
All statistically significant group-time effects were in small cohorts of just one or two states. 
 




It is difficult to make meaning of each group-time effect since there are so many groups and 
times.  Using the aggregation method in the Doubly-Robust Difference in Differences package in R 
(Callaway & Sant’Anna, 2020), I averaged the group-time effects into cohort effects.  Graph (a) in 
Figure 3-3 shows average effects of adopting RAI policy on imprisonment rates in each cohort 
across all their post-treatment periods.  The 2000, 2007, and the 2018 cohorts saw imprisonment 
rates reduced by 30.10, 99.95, and 13.51 percentage points respectively.  The 2008 cohort was the 
only group to experience a statistically significant increase (52.46 points) in imprisonment rates.  
Graph (b) shows policy effects on new prison admissions (logged).  The RAI policy effect on prison 
admissions for the 2000 cohort was an 11.45% decrease.  The 2010 cohort admissions dropped 
10.79%.  In contrast, the 2007 cohort admissions increased by 24.06% and the 2012 cohort 
admissions increased by 58.08%. 
Next, I calculated the overall average treatment effects by aggregating the cohort effects. 
These are comparable to the traditional ATT recovered in the TWFE model.  Table 3-3 shows the 
results for each outcome.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  The first column shows 
coefficients from the static two-way fixed effect model using state-level covariates, with state and 
year fixed effects.  The second column (a) displays overall treatment effects from the group-time 
approach (Calloway & Sant'Anna, 2020) using never treated states as the control group, i.e., states 
that did not adopt RAI policy during the study period.  The third column (b) shows overall 
treatment effects using the same method but using not-yet-treated states as the control group, i.e., 
states that did not adopt RAI policy or adopted RAI policy at a later time.  Only policy effects on 
imprisonment rates were statistically significant.  In the TWFE model the average treatment effect 
on the imprisonment rate was -20.54 (p = 0.025).  The two estimates from the group-time approach 
were similar.  I estimate a reduction in the imprisonment rate of 12.06 points using the never treated 




only the latter is statistically significant.  This is most likely due to the larger control group offering 
more efficiency and smaller standard errors. 
The cohorts that were more strongly affected noticeably consist of states that adopted RAI 
policy early on.  It follows that they also experienced the policy for a longer time.  To test whether 
length of exposure to the policy influenced policy effects I use duration models from 9 years before 
to 9 years after policy adoption.  Figure 3-4 shows the effect of policy adoption on a) imprisonment 
rates and b) new prison admissions (logged) for cohorts that had the policy for at least x years.  
Event times to the left of 0 are pre-treatment years.  For both outcomes, pre-treatment effects are all 
very close to 0, again supporting the parallel trends assumption.  Years to the right of 0, or post-
treatment effects, are more varied but none are statistically significant. 
3.4  Discussion and implications                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
Incarceration rates have begun to fall, but much more slowly than they rose, and there is 
uncertainty whether they will continue the downward trend or climb once more.  There is an 
abundance of research on the rise of mass incarceration.  It is just as important to study and 
understand the policies that are effective in decarceration.  I find moderate evidence that mandating 
RAIs at the state level leads to a decrease in imprisonment rates but does not affect new admissions.  
I also find that RAI policy had stronger effects on early adopters, but not because they had the 
policy in place for longer.  My results show neither that experiencing the policy for more years 
increases effects, nor that effects wain over time.  However, the ATTs hide group and group-time 
effects that vary widely by cohort and provide a wealth of information about when and where the 
policy was effective. 
Group-time and cohort effects are a good starting point for exploring effective assessment 
policies for prison population reduction.  As with many difference in differences models, averages 




and Sant’Anna’s group-time approach we can see where those differences are.  By estimating policy 
effects for every cohort in each year of the study, these results provide a guide for further research 
on when and where RAI mandates had a significant effect on prison populations.  Policy effects on 
imprisonment rates were strongest on early adopters and smaller cohorts.  For example, the average 
treatment effect of RAI policy adoption on the 1999 cohort was an 81.54 point reduction in the 
imprisonment rate.  The 1999 cohort consists of only one state, Washington, and all but three of its 
group-time effects were null.  Examining their group-time effects over time shows a large drop in 
the imprisonment rate from 2014 to 2015.  It is unlikely that the RAI policy would cause a sudden 
drop six years after it was adopted.  The policy effect is probably spurious.  In fact, Washington 
experienced a large increase in the percentage of inmates released that year (Carson & Andersom, 
2016), which might explain the change.  All but one of the statistically significant post-treatment 
group-time effects came from cohorts with only one state, and 86% were from just three states: 
Kansas, Texas, and Pennsylvania.  A case study on these three states might reveal the necessary 
factors for strong policy outcomes, perhaps in some combination with other policy reforms. 
Like imprisonment rates, the cohort and group-time effects for new admissions were 
diverse.  20% of the post-treatment group-time effects were statistically significant and spanned 7 
cohorts.  Cohort effects were quite strong, with one group seeing an increase in new prison 
admissions of almost 60%.  These cohorts were also small, consisting of one or two states.  At 
times, the effect on admissions is in the opposite direction as the imprisonment rate.  In other 
words, new prison admissions increased while imprisonment rates decreased, and vis versa.  This is 
likely due to heterogeneity in RAI policy design across states.  Policies mandate the use of RAIs at 
different points in the process which has implications for the relationship between policy and 
outcome.  For example, I would expect pretrial RAIs to have direct effects on jail populations, but 




number and combination of policy components may also influence outcomes.  For example, some 
states use a package of assessments at multiple points in the process.  Future analyses should 
evaluate whether a system of assessments is more effective than any one RAI on its own. 
More information about meso-level policy implementation is needed.  Averages on a macro-
level, even using innovative methods, wash out policy heterogeneity.  On the ground level, there is a 
rich literature building around how actors use, or misuse, RAIs as tools for decision-making and 
how that affects different groups of individuals (Corbett-Davies, Pierson, Feller, Goel, & Huq, 2017; 
Kleinberg, Lakkaraju, Leskovec, Ludwig, & Mullainathan, 2017; Skeem, Scurich, & Monahan, 2019; 
M. T. Stevenson & Doleac, 2019).  However, to understand why states respond so differently to 
RAI policies, we need more information about how states and local jurisdictions choose to fulfill 
policy mandates.  For example, the choice of assessment may have different effects on different 
jurisdictions even when used at the same point in the process.  Another important factor may be the 
position of the individual filling out the form; The responsibility of filling out the assessment falls to 
different court officials and is sometimes partially automated.  Procedural characteristics such as 
these are often codified and can be included in empirical analysis.  These data can be combined with 




























Imprisonment rate 391.32 294.47 415.5414 383.57 421.19 
 
(161.60) (140.81) (157.39) (166.32) (138.24) 
New prison admissions 7571.98 6867.13 7750.50 7065.35 9496.83 
 
(9102.99) (9247.27) (9061.46) (8624.78) (10523.07) 
Percent Black population 10.83 5.95 12.04 10.25 13.05 
 
(9.59) (6.01) (9.93) (0.54) (9.50) 
Violent crime rate 433.74 431.13 434.39 450.74 368.29 
 
(213.57) (263.79) (199.18) (227.77) (127.14) 
Property crime rate 3456.62 3482.51 3450.151 3642.162 2742.39 
 
(1110.88) (1392.87) (1029.01) (1115.28) (745.42) 
Poverty rate 12.69 13.10 12.59 12.68 12.76 
 
(3.54) (3.45) (3.56) (3.57) (3.43) 
Percent Democrats on state 49.84 49.87 49.83 51.75 42.46 
     legislature (17.77) (16.81) (18.01) (17.39) (17.30) 
Per capita income 43532.22 44719.43 43235.42 42169.51 48777.97 
     (2018 dollars) (8389.19) (9013.98) (8202.87) (8232.67) (6772.86) 
Number of observations 
     
   Imprisonment rate 1450 290 1160 1151 299 
   New prison admissions 1435 290 1145 1136 299 
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.  Column one refers to the full panel of state-years.  Columns 2 and 3 
refer to state-years in states that did not adopt RAI policy during the study period and states that did, respectively.  



















2009 CA, IL, SC, TN 
2010 CO, NH 
2011 AR, DE, KY, LA, NC, OH, WI 
2012 HI, GA 
2013 SD, WV 
2014 ID, MI, MS, NJ, VT 
2015 AK, AL, CT, NV, UT 
2016 IA, MD 
2017 IN, MT, OK, RI 
2018 MO 
 
Table 3-3. Comparisons of average treatment effects on the treated 
  Aggregated Overall Treatment Effect 
 Outcome TWFE (a) Never treated (b) Not Yet Treated 
Imprisonment rate -20.54 -12.06 -14.97 
 (8.91)* (6.17) (6.68)* 
New prison admissions (logged) -0.00005 0.07 0.05 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *p< 0.05. All models are clustered at the state level.  The first 
column shows coefficients from the static two-way fixed effect model using state-level covariates, and state and 
year fixed effects.  The second column displays overall treatment effects from the group-time approach 
(Calloway & Sant'Anna, 2020) using never treated states as the control group, i.e. states that did not adopt RAI 
policy during the study period.  Column 3 shows overall treatment effects using the same method, but using not 
yet treated states as the control group, i.e. states that did not adopt RAI policy or adopted RAI policy at a later 
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CHAPTER 4: THE EFFECT OF STATE-LEVEL RISK ASSESSMENT POLICY ON 
RACIAL DISPARITIES IN PRISON SENTENCE LENGTHS 
 
4.1  Introduction 
In the late 2000s risk assessment instruments (RAIs) gained prominence as a promising tool 
to reduce prison populations and racial disparities throughout the criminal justice system.  RAIs are 
commonly used at multiple points in the criminal justice system, but are still controversial, especially 
at sentencing.  In 2007, the Conference of Chief Justices and the Conference of State Court 
Administrators enacted resolutions calling for the use of best practices to reduce recidivism, naming 
risk assessments one of those best practices.  A working group of court leaders, practitioners, and 
researchers published a report with guidelines on the use of risk assessments at sentencing.  The 
National Conference of State Legislatures published a companion piece with Pew Research detailing 
how 10 jurisdictions use the assessments and how well they align with the guidelines.  However, a 
supreme court case in Wisconsin ruled that “using a risk assessment tool to determine the length 
and severity of a sentence is a poor fit” (Wisconsin, 2016).  Nevertheless, by 2018 eight states had 
passed legislation mandating the use of RAIs at sentencing for some offenders.  These actions were 
guided by hope more than evidence.  Though there is an ongoing and intense effort to validate 
assessments for accuracy and equity, we know little about the broader impacts of policies that force 
the courts’ hand regardless of local environment or the specific brand of risk assessment.  This study 
examines whether imposing a state-wide mandate to use RAIs for sentencing decisions results in 
equitable outcomes.




the harsh treatment of Black individuals by law enforcement, courts, and corrections systems is well 
documented.  The Sentencing Project estimates that African Americans are incarcerated at 5.1 times 
the rate of White Americans, with some states reaching a ratio of more than 10 to 1 (Nellis, 2016).  
The causes of systemic racial disparities in prisons and jails are structural, stemming from legislation 
and local policies that have disparate impacts, unintended or otherwise (Alexander, 2010; Mauer, 
1999; Mesic et al., 2018; Roberts, 2004).  The high proportion of individuals, mostly men, in Black 
communities who leave for and return from prison has caused economic and social loss that will be 
felt for generations (Clear, 2007; Roberts, 2004; Western & Wildeman, 2009).  In the 1990s there 
was a movement towards a more prescriptive system which limited judicial discretion and bias 
(Tonry, 1995).  However, the laws that emerged did little more than fill prisons and devastate entire 
communities.  Federal and state policies like determinant sentencing, mandatory minimums, and 
Three-Strikes laws, are now associated with mass incarceration rather than public safety.  Risk 
assessment policies fall into a middle ground; they require court officials to consider assessment 
results but stop short of mandating any particular sentence based on those results. 
Research on sentencing practices may include two outcomes of interest: 1) the decision to 
send convicted offenders to prison or to alternative programing, and 2) sentence length.  Risk 
assessments may be used to support decision-making for both sentencing outcomes.  Studies using 
data especially from the 1980s and 90s find that race plays a role in the former but not the latter 
(Chiricos & Crawford, 1995; Spohn, 2000).  However, more recent work has found racial differences 
in sentence length (Doerner & Demuth, 2009; Franklin, 2018).  I estimate the change in racial 
inequality in sentence length when RAI policy is imposed.    
RAI sentencing policies mandate an assessment of risk for some sentencing decisions.  They 
are used in conjunction with sentencing guidelines and judicial discretion (Elek, Warren, & Casey, 




studies focused on the merits and mechanics of individual assessments.  Overall, the instruments are 
more consistent and accurate than human discretion, even professional ones (Goel, Shroff, Skeem, 
& Slobogin, 2018; Jung, Concannon, Shroff, Goel, & Goldstein, 2017).  Validation analysis usually 
includes a comparison of false positive rates for different races, called classification parity.  Some 
assessments also undergo calibration to ensure that outcomes are independent of protected 
attributes, like race, conditional on risk score (Goel et al., 2018).  However, scholars have also noted 
that different measures of fairness are impossible to hold at once (Berk, Heidari, Jabbari, Kearns, & 
Roth, 2018; Corbett-Davies & Goel, 2018) and are sometimes counterproductive to avoiding 
disparate impacts (Goel et al., 2018).  Risk assessments are included in a larger conversation about 
automated racism.  Researchers have found that because algorithms are built using biased historical 
data, they disproportionately target and harm people of color (Eubanks, 2018; Noble, 2018; O’Neil, 
2017).  There is concern that RAIs could and will be used as tools of social control (Silver & Miller, 
2016).   
This scholarly debate over racial bias in risk assessments is ongoing, all the while local 
jurisdictions and states continue to adopt policies that turn the practice of using RAI scores into law.  
There is much less attention on the effects of those policies.  To ensure that risk assessments are 
equitable it is important to understand not just the instrument itself but how outcomes play out after 
they are put in the hands of people, and on a large scale.  Another benefit of broadening analysis to 
policy rather than instrument is that it allows for the inclusion of more jurisdictions.  I use data on 
all 50 states with the goal of developing a sense of what states can expect regarding racial disparities 
as a result of legislating RAIs at sentencing. 
4.2  Methods 
I used offender-level data from the National Corrections Reporting Program (NCRP) Prison 




include offender’s race, age range, education, state of jurisdiction, year of admission, offense type, 
and sentence length.  All variables, including the dependent variable, are categorical.  I used only 
new prison admissions to capture the effect of newly implemented policy and because analysis of 
general incarceration rates overrepresent offenders serving long sentences (see Felson & Krajewski, 
2020).  I dropped cases of admissions for parole revocation, cases of non- White or Black offenders, 
and cases that were missing sentence length, admission year, race, or offense type leaving a final 
dataset of 3,408,064 observations across 46 states.  Table 4-1 shows the proportion of offenders in 
each category for all covariates.  About 56% of inmates were White, and 44% were Black.  Black 
inmates were more likely to be imprisoned for violent and drug related crimes than White inmates, 
and White inmates were more likely than Black inmates to be in prison for property crimes.  
Sentence length, the dependent variable, is recorded in 7 levels: 1) less than one year, 2) 1-1.9 years, 
3) 2-4.9 years, 4) 5-9.9 years 5) 10-24.9 years 6) 25 years or more, and 7) Life in prison, life in prison 
without parole, or death.  The most common sentence length for all inmates was 2-4.9 years.  The 
within race proportion of offenders at each sentence level was similar for Black and White 
offenders. 
For policy data I used an original panel dataset of state-wide RAI policies from 1990 to 
2018.   I coded each state-year observation with indicators for several policy components in years 
when RAI policy was present, including an indicator when the law requires RAIs for sentencing 
decisions for some offenders.  A second coder did the same.  Indicator assignment matched for 92% 
of coding decisions (Cohen’s kappa = 0.74).  I then merged offender admission data with state 
policy data from the previous year to allow time for the policy to take effect. In 2018, eight states 
mandated the use of RAIs at sentencing for particular offenders14.  In some cases, the law is unclear 
 
14 The states which have RAI sentencing policies are Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Montana, Ohio, Tennessee, Utah, 




on which offenders should receive an assessment.  For example, the Montana Code Annotated 
stipulates that a defendant’s risk assessment results shall be reported “whenever a [presentence] 
investigation is required” (MCA).  However, the aim of this research is not to test effects of the 
assessments themselves, but rather to estimate the effect of the policy, including the design choice 
whether or not to specify clearly which sentencing decisions should consider RAI results.  Therefor 
policy effects are valid regardless of the prevalence of actual RAI score consideration.  It would be 
plausible and interesting to estimate the effects on a target population, however, given that most 
policies do not provide a target population, results from this analysis should be interpreted broadly 
as average effects of RAI sentencing policy for all offenders sentenced to state prisons. 
The nature of sentencing level is ordinal, from shortest/least severe to longest/most severe.  
Therefor to estimate the effect of RAI sentencing policy on sentence length for Black and White 
inmates I used a series of ordered logistic regressions.  Ordered logistic regressions provide odds 
ratios of receiving a longer sentence and allow for predicted probabilities under specified conditions.  
I used offender age, gender, and education as controls.  Robust standard errors were clustered by 
state to account for state-level trends including other policies.  Estimates are reported for all 
offenses combined, and separately for each offense type. 
Ordered logistic regressions assume proportional odds, i.e. that covariates have the same 
effect across outcomes.  For example, it assumes that the odds of a Black offender receiving a 
sentence of less than one year vs. any other sentence level are the same as the odds of a Black 
offender receiving a sentence of 1-4.9 years vs. any other sentence.  However, the dataset is large 
with over 3 million cases.  Tests of proportional odds, or parallel regression, nearly always fail when 
the sample size is large (Allison, 1999; Clogg & Shihadeh, 1994).  To observe if and to what degree 
the assumption is violated I ran a series of binary logistic regressions for each sentence outcome 




varies for Black offenders.  For example, for property crimes the odds of a Black offender receiving 
a sentence of life in prison or death is 2.24 times that of White offenders, while the odds for a 
sentence of 5-9.9 years is .84 that of White offenders.  This confirms violation of the proportional 
odds assumption.  However, it also confirms the racial disparities in sentencing length found in 
recent research.  This paper asks whether RAI sentencing policies moderate the “effect of race” 15.  
If they do, the effect of race should not be statistically significant in jurisdictions with RAI policies. 
As a robustness check I also estimated effects using multinomial logistic regressions for each 
offense category with the same specifications.  This analysis returns separate estimates for the odds 
of receiving each sentence level.  Multinomial logistic regressions assume independence of irrelevant 
alternatives, meaning the ratio of any two probabilities are independent of the remaining choices.  In 
this case, it assumes that if any sentence level were omitted, offenders would be sorted into the 
remaining levels proportionally.  This is usually a strong assumption, however, here the assumption 
holds.  Offenders do not self-select their sentence level.  It is reasonable to presume that offenders 
sentenced to the omitted category would instead be sentenced to an alternative of equal severity, and 
the remaining offenders would still be sorted into the appropriate sentence levels. 
I also ask whether RAIs reduce racial differences in the probability of receiving a given 
sentence length.  It is possible for a policy to moderate the effect of race such that the gap between 
races is widened, or affects one race more than the other.  To probe further, I compare the 




15 To be clear, race itself does not cause outcomes.  Instead, many cultural and historical factors, some observable and 
some not, are highly correlated with race so that the variable “race” captures the average effect of the experience of 





4.3  Results 
Results from the ordered and the multinomial logistic regressions were similar, with ordered 
results slightly more conservative16.  A test of Akaike’s Information Criteria returned the same score 
for both models.  Here, I discuss the results of the ordered logistic regression because it allows for 
comparative language of “longer” and “shorter” sentences, as opposed to speaking of each sentence 
level separate from the others.  There is one model that includes all offenses, and separate models 
for each offense type.  The independent variables of interest in all models are 1) race, 2) an indicator 
for the presence of RAI sentencing policy at the time of admission, and 3) an interaction between 
the two.  Offender age, education level, and gender, were controls, and robust standard errors were 
clustered by state.  Table 4-3 shows the odds ratios resulting from the regressions.  Holding all else 
constant, the only factor with a statistically significant effect on sentence length was race in cases of 
violent crime.  The odds of Black inmates receiving a longer sentence for a violent crime was 1.17 
times that of White inmates, confirming racial bias in violent crime sentencing outcomes.  The 
interactions between race and policy were not statistically significant suggesting that RAI sentencing 
policies have no effect on the odds of Black inmates receiving longer sentences compared to White 
inmates without the policy. 
However, the interaction of odds ratios are difficult to translate into real world effects.  To 
make direct comparisons between Black and White offender sentences I calculated the difference in 
predicted probabilities for both races for each type of crime at every sentence level.  Full tables of 
predictions are available in Appendix B.  Figure 4-1 displays the predicted probabilities of each 
sentence level for Black offenders relative to White offenders and 95% confidence intervals with 
and without RAI sentencing policy.  Open circles show the difference between Black and White 
offender probabilities of receiving x sentence length when there is no RAI sentencing policy in place 
 




at the time of admission.  Solid circles show the difference when there is RAI policy at the time of 
admission.  Graph (a) confirms that there is little difference between races in sentence length across 
all offenses with all points hovering around zero.  Graphs by offense type, however, tell a different 
story.  For violent crime, graph (b), without a RAI policy Black offenders have a statistically 
significant lower probability than White offenders of receiving a sentence of less than 5 years, but a 
higher probability of receiving a sentence of more than 10 years or the death penalty.  The largest 
gap is at 10-24.9 years where Black offenders are 2.34 percentage points more likely than White 
offenders to receive a sentence within that range.  In contrast, with RAI policy all confidence 
intervals cross 0.  This suggests RAI sentencing policy reduces racial disparities in sentencing 
offenders who have committed violent crimes. 
For property crimes and drug crimes, estimated differences without RAI policy are larger 
than violent crimes but not statistically significant.  Like violent crimes, racial disparities are closer to 
zero and not statistically significant with RAI policy.  Racial differences without RAI policy in public 
order crimes are the smallest of all offense types.  It is also the only offense type to show increases 
in disparities with RAI policy.  Black offenders are more likely than White offenders to receive a 
sentence of less than one year, and less likely to receive a sentence of 5-9.9 years with a policy.   RAI 
policy seems to increase racial differences in public order crimes at shorter sentences.  Public order 
crimes include prostitution, pornography, and driving under the influence. 
I also calculated within race differences with and without RAI sentencing policy.  There are 
no statistically significant differences for either race.  However, results illustrate potential benefits to 
both Black and White offenders.  Taking violent crime as the example, Figure 4-2 shows the change 
in predicted probability of sentence length for both races holding all else constant.  Each graph 
shows the difference for the given sentence level.  Solid circles are predictions for Black offenders, 




no one has a RAI policy at the time of admission, and the right half is the probability when everyone 
has a RAI policy.  The dashed line connects points with and without a policy for each race, with the 
difference in text.  When a RAI policy is imposed the probability of being sentenced to less than 5 
years increases for both races (graphs a-c).  The probability of being sentenced to more than 5 years 
or death decreases for both races (graphs d-f).  This is evidence that the decrease in racial disparities 
with RAI policy is not due to subjecting White offenders to harsher penalties in lieu of Black 
offenders, but rather due to differences in the magnitude of change for each race. 
4.4  Discussion and implications 
I find no evidence that RAI sentencing policies alter the effect of race on sentence lengths.  
The odds of receiving longer or shorter sentences do not change for Black or White offenders when 
the state adopts a RAI policy.  However, there is some evidence that RAI policy narrows racial 
disparities in certain contexts.  There are no policy effects when all offenses are analyzed together, 
however, patterns emerge by offense type.  The policy effect is especially pronounced in cases of 
violent crime.  Imposing RAI policy eliminates Black and White offender differences in the 
probability of receiving a sentence of less than 5 years and more than 10 years.  Though the percent 
point changes are small, they imply large real world effects.  If all offenders were in jurisdictions with 
RAI sentencing policy at the time of admission an estimated 25,701 Black offenders and 37,664 
White offenders would have avoided a lengthy sentence of 10-25 years for violent, property, and 
drug crimes. 
The direction of the Black/White disparity differs depending on sentence length.  Black 
offenders are more likely than White offenders to receive long sentences for violent crime, and less 
likely than White offenders to receive shorter sentences.  However, there are smaller or no 
differences in most other offense categories.  These results support literature on “contextual 




some circumstances (Spohn & Delone, 2000; Walker, Spohn, & DeLone, 2016).  This is likely 
because the nature of racial stereotypes is also complex.  Black individuals are judged as less 
deserving, more aggressive, or held more responsible than other groups depending on the 
circumstances (Holbrook, Fessler, & Navarrete, 2016; Howard, 2019; Kreitzer & Smith, 2018; 
Reyna, Henry, Korfmacher, & Tucker, 2006; Tonry, 2010).  Therefor the context of crime is of great 
importance.  Information about the environment of the jurisdiction, – such as political and punitive 
preferences – details about each case, – such as the race of the victim or the arresting officer or the 
judge, or about the crime within the offense category – and about the offender – such as criminal 
history and unemployment status – would allow for more precise models and shed light on when 
and why policy affects equitable outcomes. 
Nevertheless, these results demonstrate differential policy effects by offense type and 
provide a starting point for future investigation of the impact of RAI policy in multiple fields.  One 
of the main foci in criminology and sociology literature is on disparate impacts of drug policies and 
court practices in drug cases.  My results provide little evidence that RAI sentencing policies make a 
significant impact on racial disparities in drug crimes.  However, there is strong evidence that RAI 
policies reduce racial disparities in sentencing for violent crimes.  This is an important result to note.  
These results run counter to previous studies which have found larger racial differences in 
sentencing for non-violent and less serious crime.  The rationalization seems to be that White 
offenders are not given the same amount of leniency in serious crimes so racial differences are 
minimized.  Yet, research on capital punishment (the most serious penalty reserved for the most 
heinous crimes) is clear that Black offenders have been unfairly targeted and sent to death row 
(Baumgartner et al., 2018; Kotch & Mosteller, 2010; Steiker & Steiker, 2015).  My results are more 




Stevenson & Doleac, 2019).  It would be far more surprising if racial inequality existed for crimes at 
low and high levels of severity, but not in between. 
In addition, there has been movement to address historical injustices in sentencing for drug 
crimes.  The First Step Act of 2010 reduced mandatory sentence lengths for crack cocaine crimes 
closer to those of powder cocaine in the federal prison system.  This resulted in over 3,000 sentence 
reductions and over 2,100 releases (Justice, 2020).  States have passed similar laws often in a “Justice 
Reinvestment” act.  However, reform efforts have not focused on violent crime.  In fact, criminal 
codes have gotten stricter regarding violent crime.  Research shows that liberal state governments 
are especially prone to reducing the severity of punishment for non-violent and drug crimes while 
increasing penalties for violent crimes (Barker, 2009).  This is a politically palatable compromise for 
both politicians and the public.  However, it may exacerbate racial disparities in the prison system as 
a larger proportion of inmates are there for more serious crimes.  Unless disparities for those 
offenses also receive attention, policymakers will have to decide whether they are willing to sacrifice 
justice for more serious crimes in return for addressing injustice at lower levels.  These results 
suggest that mandating RAIs at sentencing may increase racial equity in sentencing practices while 




4.5  Tables 
 










3408064 44.1% 55.9% 
Policy No RAI 91.2% 92.5% 90.1%  
RAI 8.8% 7.5% 9.9% 
Sentence length < 1 year 18.4% 18.7% 18.2%  
1-1.9 years 10.0% 9.3% 10.6% 
 
2-4.9 years 36.1% 36.1% 36.1% 
 
5-9.9 years 20.9% 20.7% 21.1% 
 
10-24.9 years 11.7% 11.8% 11.6% 
 
>=25 years 1.9% 2.2% 1.6% 
 
Life/Death 1.0% 1.2% 0.8% 
Highest level of education <HS diploma/GED 31.0% 35.9% 27.1%  
HS diploma/GED 29.3% 27.3% 30.9% 
 
Any college 6.0% 5.2% 6.7% 
 
Ungraded/unknown 33.7% 31.6% 35.3% 
Gender Male 85.7% 90.6% 81.9% 
 
Female 14.3% 9.4% 18.1% 
Age at admission 18-24 years 24.1% 29.3% 20.0% 
 
25-34 years 34.2% 32.6% 35.4% 
 
35-44 years 23.2% 20.7% 25.2% 
 
45-54 years 14.3% 13.6% 14.9% 
 
55+ years 4.1% 3.1% 4.4% 
 
Missing <1% <1% <1% 
Categorization of most  
serious sentenced offense 
Violent 24.8% 28.2% 22.1% 
Property 30.4% 25.0% 34.7% 
 
Drugs 26.7% 29.5% 24.4% 





































Life or Death 
sentence 
Black All 1.04 0.87 1 0.97 1.1 1.38 1.57 
 Violent 0.79 0.75 0.97 1.04 1.1 1.15 1.24 
 Property 1.25 0.94 1.02 0.89 0.78 1.18 2.25 
 Drugs 1.13 0.9 1.13 0.9 0.79 1.2 1.52 
 Public 
offense 
1.08 1 0.95 0.96 1.02 1.26 1.38 
Note: Odds ratios from logistic regressions with sentence level as outcome and race as the only covariate.  Each 
row is a separate model. 
 
 












RAI policy 0.79 0.71 0.85 0.74 -0.18 
 (0.265) (.204) (.319) (.316) (.331) 
Black 0.98 1.17 0.8 0.81 -0.04 
 (.105) (.091)* (.109) (.104) (.119) 
RAI*Black 1.06 0.939 1.13 1.26 -0.26 
 (.154) (.103) (.223) (.255) (.173) 
Note: Results of ordered logistic regressions with offender-level controls.  Robust standard 
errors in parentheses, clustered by state.  *p<.05. Each column is a separate model including 





4.6  Figures 






Note: Black/White difference in predicted probability from ordered logistic regression estimates with 95% 
confidence intervals.  Separate models for each offense.  Open circles are differences without RAI sentencing 
policy at the time of admission.  Solid circles are differences with RAI sentencing policy at the time of admission. 
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Note: Predicted probabilities for violent crimes sentencing for Black offenders (circles) and White offenders 




























































































































































































































































AK 2016 SB 91 X      

















  X X   
CT 2015 SB 796   X    






  X X X X 
HI 2012 SB 2866 X  X   X 
IA 2016 HB 2064   X    
ID 2014 SB 1357   X X   






  X  X  
KS 2000 SB 323  X     


















  X    
MO 2018 HB 1355   X X X  
MS 2014 HB 585   X X  X 
MT 2017 SB 60 X X X X   












X  X X   
NJ 2014 SB 946 X      









17 The table does not distinguish between components included in separate bills. 






























SB603   X  X  




X  X X X  































 X  X X  
VA 1994 HB 5001  X     
VT 2014 SB 295 X      
WA 1999 SB 5421       
WI 2011 SB 104       
WV 2013 SB 371 X      
VA 1994 HB500  X     
Note: Column (b) is the year in which the policy was adopted, and column (c) is the bill number.  If multiple bills 
were passed, all years and bill numbers are included.  Columns (e) – (i) display an “X” when the law includes the  
policy component in the heading17.  For example, Alaska senate bill 91 passed in 2016 and legislated the use of 










Table B-1. Predicted probabilities of receiving sentence in the absence of RAI sentencing policy 
Crime type 
(1) 



















       
Black 18.3% 10.0% 36.1% 21.0% 11.7% 1.9% 1.0% 
 
(.043) (.018) (.027) (.022) (.022) (.003) (.002) 
White 18.0% 9.8% 36.1% 21.3% 12.0% 1.9% 1.0% 
 
(.035) (.019) (.027) (.036) (.021) (.002) (.002) 
Violent 
       
Black 6.5% 6.1% 29.7% 25.5% 22.8% 6.2% 4.0% 
 
(.018) (.013) (.027) (.013) (.027) (.008) (.006) 
White 7.7% 5.3% 32.2% 25.0% 20.4% 5.3% 3.4% 
 
(.019) (.015) (.028) (.015) (.024) (.006) (.004) 
Property 
       
Black 23.4% 12.7% 37.9% 17.9% 7.7% 0.5% 0.1% 
 
(.065) (.023) (.041) (.031) (.022) (.001) (.0002) 
White 19.7% 11.5% 38.3% 20.4% 9.4% 0.6% 0.1% 
 
(.045) (.023) (.036) (.028) (.024) (.001) (.0002) 
Drug 
       
Black 22.5% 11.2% 35.6% 20.5% 9.5% 0.7% 0.1% 
 
(055) (.021) (.031) (.027) (.019) (.002) (.0002) 
White 19.0% 10.1% 35.5% 23.1% 11.4% 0.9% 0.1% 
 
(.043) (.020) (.029) (.028) (.024) (.002) (.0003) 
Public Order 
       
Black 25.0% 11.2% 40.1% 17.2% 5.8% 0.6% 0.1% 
 
(.048) (.021) (.033) (.023) (.013) (.002) (.0003) 
White 24.2% 11.0% 40.3% 17.7% 6.0% 0.6% 0.1% 
 
(.046) (.023) (.033) (.025) (.013) (.002) (.0004) 
Note: Predicted probabilities from ordered logistic regressions when RAI sentencing policy = 0.   Robust standard 
errors in parentheses.  Rows in crime type “All” include all observations, followed by separate models for each 









Table B-2. Predicted probabilities of receiving sentence with RAI sentencing policy 
Crime type 
(1) 


















       
Black 21.0% 10.8% 36.4% 19.3% 10.2% 1.6% 0.8% 
 
(.056) (.024) (.028) (.033) (.027) (.005) (.002) 
White 21.5% 11.0% 36.4% 18.9% 9.9% 1.6% 0.8% 
 
(.215) (.025) (.029) (.036) (.028) (.005) (.002) 
Violent 
       
Black 9.5% 7.3% 35.0% 23.7% 17.5% 4.3% 2.7% 
 
(.029) (.019) (.037) (.022) (.031) (.010) (.006) 
White 10.3% 7.8% 36.0% 23.1% 16.4% 3.9% 2.5% 
 
(.031) (.020) (.038) (.023) (.030) (.009) (.006) 
Property 
       
Black 24.0% 12.8% 37.7% 17.4% 7.5% 0.5% 0.7% 
 
(.054) (.025) (.039) (.028) (0.19) (.001) (.0002) 
White 22.4% 12.4% 38.0% 18.5% 8.1% 0.5% 0.7% 
 
(.069) (.029) (.039) (.043) (.028) (.002) (.0003) 
Drug 
       
Black 23.6% 11.5% 35.5% 19.7% 9.0% 0.7% 0.1% 
 
(.081) (.028) (.032) (.049) (.033) (.003) (.0003) 
White 24.0% 11.6% 35.5% 19.5% 8.8% 0.7% 0.1% 
 
(.083) (.028) (.032) (.051) (.034) (.003) (.0003) 
Public Order 
       
Black 34.0% 12.7% 36.6% 12.4% 3.8% 0.4% 0.1% 
 
(.068) (.027) (.041) (.033) (.014) (.001) (.0003) 
White 27.7% 11.8% 39.3% 15.6% 5.1% 0.5% 0.1% 
 
(.056) (.026) (.033) (.034) (.016) (.002) (.0004) 
Note: Predicted probabilities from ordered logistic regressions when RAI sentencing policy = 1.   Standard errors 
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